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Abstract
The national highway traffic safety administration (NHTSA) identified cybersecurity of the automobile systems are more critical than the security of other
information systems. Researchers already demonstrated remote attacks on
critical vehicular electronic control units (ECUs) using controller area network
(CAN). Besides, existing intrusion detection systems (IDSs) often propose
to tackle a specific type of attack, which may leave a system vulnerable to
numerous other types of attacks. A generalizable IDS that can identify a
wide range of attacks within the shortest possible time has more practical
value than attack-specific IDSs, which is not a trivial task to accomplish. In
this paper we propose a novel graph-based Gaussian naive Bayes (GGNB)
intrusion detection algorithm by leveraging graph properties and PageRankrelated features. The GGNB on the real rawCAN data set [1] yields 99.61%,
99.83%, 96.79%, and 96.20% detection accuracy for denial of service (DoS),
fuzzy, spoofing, replay, mixed attacks, respectively. Also, using OpelAstra
data set [2], the proposed methodology has 100%, 99.85%, 99.92%, 100%,
99.92%, 97.75% and 99.57% detection accuracy considering DoS, diagnostic,
fuzzing CAN ID, fuzzing payload, replay, suspension, and mixed attacks,
respectively. The GGNB-based methodology requires about 239× and 135×
lower training and tests times, respectively, compared to the SVM classifier
used in the same application. Using Xilinx Zybo Z7 field-programmable
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gate array (FPGA) board, the proposed GGNB requires 5.7×, 5.9×, 5.1×,
and 3.6× fewer slices, LUTs, flip-flops, and DSP units, respectively, than
conventional NN architecture.
Key words: Controller area network, security, intra-vehicular
communication, graph-theory.
1. Introduction
The application of vehicular electronic control units (ECUs) depends
on intra- and inter-vehicular communication networks’ performance. These
communications are vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-infrastructure, and vehicleto-cloud. Any cyber or physical attack on these communication networks
has severe consequences, including private data leakage, financial loss, and
jeopardizing human life. As a result, it is imperative to secure these networks
of modern vehicular systems.
The typical automotive data communication networks include twisted wire
paired controller area network (CAN), single-wire local interconnect network
(LIN), FlexRay, and optical communication-based media oriented systems
transport (MOST). Figure 1 shows the vehicular network data communication
systems and some of their example applications. Among all the vehicular
data communication networks, CAN is the most popular and widely used in
modern automobile systems [3].
However, the national highway traffic safety administration (NHTSA) and
other researchers identified several security breaches on the vehicular CAN
bus [4, 5, 6]. According to the NHTSA, cybersecurity plays a more important
role in the vehicular systems than other computational and information
systems [4]. In addition to the NHTSA and industry, academic researchers
have proposed various intrusion detection systems (IDS) for the CAN bus
communications. However, the existing research fails to provide a generalized
model that can effectively tackle all kinds of CAN-monitoring-based attacks.
We hypothesize that a graph-based Gaussian naive Bayes (GGNB) IDS for
CAN bus to tackle this issue. In particular, the key contributions of this
paper are:
• This is the first introduction of graph-based model in naive Bayes
algorithm for CAN intrusion detection.
• A generalized algorithm is proposed that can detect any CAN-monitoring
attacks, including mixed attacks without modifying the protocol.
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Figure 1: The intra-vehicular communication system uses CAN for collision detection
system, MOST for audio-video bridging and time-sensitive ethernet networking, FlexRay
for the brake-by-wire system, and LIN for multifunctional keyless system [7].

• It is the first algorithm that integrates common graph properties with
PageRank (PR)-related features into a GNB algorithm.
• Overall, the proposed methodology exhibits 98.57% detection accuracy,
which is better or comparable with the state-of-the-art.
• The proposed methodology yields many fold reduction in runtime compared to the existing classification methods.
• Field-programmable gate array (FPGA) implementation of the proposed
GGNB requires 5.7×, 5.9×, 5.1×, and 3.6× fewer slices, LUTs, flip-flops,
and DSP units, respectively, than conventional NN architecture.
We organized the rest of the paper as follows: Section 2 gives a brief
overview of existing CAN bus attacks and IDSs. Section 3 proposes our
GGNB algorithm. Section 4 compares our proposed IDS with existing schemes.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Background
2.1. Attacks on CAN Bus
The ever increasing demand for autonomous vehicles and competition
to produce fully autonomous cars by the original equipment manufacturers
3

(OEMs) has grown the CAN bus’s security concern. Besides, researchers
demonstrated several security vulnerabilities in the CAN bus [8, 9]. This work
studies viirtual attacks on the safety-critical systems using a compromised
ECU through OBD-II port. The attacker is assumed to have full control
of a wide range of functions, for example, disabling the brakes, stopping
the engine, and controlling other vehicle functions using reverse engineering
code. Valasek and Miller demonstrated that it was possible to have realworld attacks on multiple vehicles using the CAN bus [10]. The researchers
successfully attacked the brakes of a Jeep Cherokee while it was driving
on a highway. Another interesting approach remotely attacked CAN and
showed that it is possible to attack the vehicle’s Bluetooth and infotainment
systems [11].
2.2. Existing Intrusion Detection Systems for CAN
The importance of securing CAN bus led researchers to propose different
IDSs [12]. Moore et al. used the regularity of CAN message frequency to
detect the anomaly [12]. A similar detection method proposed by Gmiden
et al. relied on the time intervals of CAN messages. Based on the regularity
in the signal frequencies, they hypothesized that an accurate detection of a
regular-frequency signal injection attack is possible by monitoring the intersignal wait times of CAN bus traffic. A highly accurate SVM-based IDS was
proposed by Tanksale et al. [5]. However, it is only applicable to denial of
service (DoS) attacks due to the characteristics of the IDS model.
Another interesting IDS uses a deep convolutional neural network (DCNN)
to secure the CAN [6]. This method used a frame builder that converts the
CAN bus data into a grid-like structure fed into the DCNN. However, this
method is not applicable to replay attacks due to the unique characteristics
of that attack. Zhou et al. integrate a deep neural network (DNN) with a
triple loss network [13]. In this method, the researchers extract data features
as a set of vectors and then compute the similarity between two CAN data
sequences extracted in real-time. Then the integrated approach uses an
additional calibrated data sequence to identify the malicious data.
Verendel et al. proposed a honeypot security mechanism at the wireless
gateway, acting as a decoy in simulating the in-vehicle networks [14]. This
methodology collected and analyzed the attacked information to update
the later version of the security system. The major challenge in deploying
honeypot is to make it as realistic as possible and concealing it from intruders.
4

Tariq et al. proposed a rule-based recurrent neural network (RNN) IDS
for CAN [15]. However, this approach can handle only DoS, fuzzy, and
replay attacks. On the other hand, Minawi et al. proposed a machine
learning-based IDS considering only DoS, Fuzzy, RPM Impersonation, and
Gear Impersonation attacks and exhibits good model accuracy [16]. Similarly,
Delwar et al. used only DoS, fuzzy, and spoofing attacks to build their private
dataset [17]. However, unlike these existing methods, we consider mixed
attack scenarios. As a result, we removed these methods [15, 16, 17] from our
analysis and comparisons.
2.3. Existing Attack Prevention Methodologies
To secure CAN bus, researchers proposed several techniques [18, 19, 20].
Wolf et al. [18] proposed a firewall signature-based architecture for securing
vehicular communication gateways. The firewall only allows authorized
controllers to exchange valid messages. However, this method can not fully
shield the vehicle network because most modern vehicles have interfaces
that enable access to the entire car system. Islam et al. [20] proposed the
first dynamic arbitration ID refreshing algorithm for preventing CAN traffic
monitoring based attacks. They validated their methodology using real CAN
and implementing virtual CAN to demonstrate their algorithm’s efficiency.
2.4. Existing Graph-Based Anomaly Detection
In recent years, we observed a significant increase in graph-based anomaly
detection due to the ease of representation of complex data using graphs.
Researchers used background knowledge of the evaluation metrics and biased
the substructure discovery process towards discovering anomalous substructures [21]. Background knowledge is added in the form of rule coverage,
which conveys the percentage of the final graph covered by the substructure
instances. The authors hypothesized that it is possible to discover anomalous
substructures by introducing negative weights to the rule coverage. This
method can efficiently detect 100% of the attacks with no false positives
rate using the KDD99 data set. Another relevant approach uses graph-based
anomaly detection by analyzing the data for the suspicious employee activities
at Kasios [22]. This approach provides a rich contextual and more in-depth
understanding of data due to its ability to discover patterns in databases
which are not a trivial task to identify using traditional query or statistical
tools. This method achieves a true positive rate and false positive rate of
100% and 65%, respectively.
5

2.5. Types of Attacks on CAN
The electronic fusion of automobiles brings many benefits, including driver
comforts, performance, and vehicle efficiency. However, these benefits comes
at a higher risk of cyber attacks and human safety due to automobiles’
dependencies on those devices. Researchers and OEMs already identified
security threats in CAN communication and agreed that it was not built
with security in mind [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. In this research, we consider
both fabrication and masquerade CAN attacks. When an intruder transmits
messages using a compromised ECU with a forged ID is referred to as a
fabrication attack. DoS, fuzzy, and spoofing attacks are also classified under
fabrication attacks [23, 27, 26, 28]. The diagnostic attack consists of injecting
messages of CAN ID which values are in a particular range using a diagnostic
tool [29, 2]. Fuzzy attacks are mainly composed of fuzzing CAN ID and
fuzzing payload attacks [1, 2]. The fuzzing CAN ID consists of injecting
messages with a specific CAN ID. These CAN ID values are not a part of
the legitimate values. Fuzzing payload attack involves modifying the payload
of messages that are not used in legitimate traffic. Another weak attack,
where hackers sniff in-vehicle networks and suspend message transmission
of a certain ECU, is called suspension attack [30, 2]. On the other hand, a
masquerade attack requires two compromised ECUs to mount an attack. The
masquerade attacks are considered strong attacks. A replay attack is known
as a masquerade attack [24].
3. Proposed Anomaly Detection Methodology
In this paper, we propose a graph-based anomaly detection system to
secure the CAN bus communication system. The proposed methodology
is based on the PR analysis for detecting anomalies. PR is a well-known
algorithm used by Google Search Engine to rank their websites [31]. The PR
algorithm can effectively suggest users for searching different topics in Google
as their requirements. Before presenting the proposed anomaly detection
algorithm, we will discuss the PR algorithm.
3.1. PageRank Algorithm
We will discuss the PR algorithm using a simple graph with four vertices
A, B, C, and D, as shown in Figure 2. PR is initialized to the same value
for all vertices, which assigns a probability distribution between 0 and 1. So,
6
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Figure 2: Example four-vertex directed graph for PR computation.

the initial probability distribution of each C is n1 = 0.25, where n is the total
number of vertices.
Every vertex will contribute PR to other vertices with the outgoing edges.
As a result, vertex D will contribute to A, B, and C vertices. Since D has
three outlines, it will divide its PR equally into three parts. Here, we compute
the PR of A as,
P R(A) =

P R(B)
P R(C)
P R(D)
+
+
Outdegree(B) Outdegree(C) Outdegree(D)

(1)

where Outdegree(B) is the number of edges exiting from B. We iteratively
compute PR of each vertex and assign the PR value. The iteration will stop
when there will be no update of PR of vertices. We computed the PR values of
vertices for both attacked and attack-free graphs. To identify the significance
of PR values, we performed an analysis of many graphs. According to our
observation, PR plays a vital role in detecting anomalies. Empirically, the
distribution of PR values among attack-free vertices is significantly different
from the attacked vertices. In an attack-free graph, the distribution of PR
among different vertices is similar, whereas, in an attacked graph, the PR
values of attacked vertices are significantly different from other vertices in the
graph. As a result, we used PR-related features for our anomaly detection
algorithm.
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Figure 3: (a) A simple graph where each vertex has an equal 0.25 PR value, and (b) when
a DoS attack is introduced, the PR value of 0000 ID is significantly higher than the other
vertices.

When an intruder mounts a DoS attack on a network, it floods the
communication network with a certain ID with high priority. We depict a
similar situation in Figure 3, where Figure 3(a) shows a simple graph with
each vertex with equal 0.25 PR value. On the other hand, Figure 3(b) shows
an example when vertex ID with 0000 has a PR value of 0.45, which is
significantly higher than the other vertices of that graph.
Algorithm 1 shows the PR and other PR-related feature computation
steps. We initialize all the necessary variables from Line 4 to Line 7. Then
we iteratively compute the minimum, median, and maximum PR values of
every graph gi ∈ G in Line 8 to Line 13.
3.2. Proposed Graph-Based Gaussian Naive Bayes (GGNB) IDS
The proposed graph-based IDS uses existing Gaussian naive Bayes (GNB)
classifier [32]. The GNB follows Gaussian normal distribution and supports
continuous data. In general, naive Bayes uses the posterior probability of
Bayesian rule to infer a classification label from input feature distribution.
The conditional posterior probability can be defined as the probability of an
event (A) occurring given the probability of another event that has already
occurred (B) and can be expressed as
P (A | B) =

P (A ∩ B)
P (A) · P (B | A)
=
P (B)
P (B)
8

(2)

Algorithm 1 PageRank-related features extraction algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:

Input: G, collection of graphs;
Output: The list of minimum, median, and maximum PR of each graph in G;
graphList = [] . initializing the list of the PR of every vertex from each graph
graphListW ithM edianP R = [] . initializing the list of the median PR from
each graph
graphListW ithM aximumP R = [] . initializing the list of the maximum PR
from each graph
graphListW ithM inimumP R = [] . initializing the list of the minimum PR
from each graph
for all gi ∈ G : do
graphList[i] = P R(gi ) . P R(gi ) computes the PR of every vertex of gi
graphListW ithM edianP R[i] = median(graphList[gi ])
graphListW ithM aximumP R[i] = maximum(graphList[gi ])
graphListW ithM inimumP R[i] = minimum(graphList[gi ])
end for

where P(A) and P(B) are distributions of events A and B, respectively. GNB
classifiers assume that features are independent of each other and require
a small training data to estimate the parameters needed for classification.
Since we assume that the likelihood of the features to be Gaussian. So, the
likelihood probability is given by:
(xi − µx )2
q
P (xi | y = y ) =
exp −
2σx2
2πσx2
0

1

!

(3)

where µ is the mean, and σ is the standard deviation. Assume that we
have an unknown binary outcome Y and n continuous features of X. As
we have a binary label, Y is Bernoulli, which can be defined by setting a
positive probability. The likelihood of fX|Y (x|y) is the distribution of the
observation for the known outcome. Our updated knowledge or posterior
about the unknown after observation is pY |X (y|x). We can express the Bayes
rule as
pY (y)fX|Y (x|y)
0
0
y 0 pY (y )fX|Y (x|y )

pY |X (y|x) = P

(4)

The Equation 4 is true for the n continuous variables X = X0 , X1 , . . . , Xn−1
9

and can be expressed as,
pY |X0 ,X1 ,...,Xn−1 (y|x0 , x1 , . . . , xn−1 ) =
Q
pY (y) n−1
i=0 fXi |Y (xi |y)
Qn−1
P1
0
0
y 0 =0 pY (y ) i=0 fXi |Y (xi |y )

(5)

Before discussing the proposed algorithm, we give a simple example of
an attack detection mechanism. Assume that in a certain number of graphs,
we have the probability of attacked and attack free graphs are 0.5. Then we
compute the normal distribution of each feature of those graphs. To identify
a graph with Vi vertices and Ei edges weather it is attacked or attack free,
we utilized the likelihood (L) condition as
sAtt = P (att) ∗ L(N odes = Vi | att) ∗ L(Edges = Ei | att)

(6)

sAttF r = P (attF r) ∗ L(N odes = Vi | attF r)∗
L(Edges = Ei | attF r)

(7)

where P (att) and P (attF r) are probability of attack and attack free data,
respectively. And If sAtt and sAttF r values are underflow, a log function
before them can help us to restore a comparable value. The algorithm
compares the sAtt and sAttF r values to decide if the graph is attacked
or attack free. If sAtt is greater than sAttF r then the graph is attacked.
Table 1 shows the list of features we used in our proposed anomaly detection
algorithm.
The proposed anomaly detection methodology is shown in Algorithm 2.
It accepts raw CAN data and window size as inputs and predicts whether the
input is attacked or attack free. For the analysis, we used ∼ 23ms as window
size considering 1Mbit/s CAN speed. The proposed algorithm will first create
a list of graphs g1 , g2 , . . . , gn named G based on the user-provided window
size in Line 4. The CAN message IDs will act as vertices, and we construct an
edge between two vertices depending on their sequence. We declared different
list variables from Line 5 to Line 10. In Line 11, we declared a for loop. In
each iteration of the for loop, we collect nodes, edges, maximum in-degree,
maximum out-degree, minimum in-degree, minimum out-degree from each
graph g from Line 10 to Line 18. Then we compute the PR-related features
using the GraphListP ageRank(G) function which calls the Algorithm 1 in
Line 19. The data processing and labeling are performed in Line 19. In
10

Algorithm 2 Anomaly Detection Algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:

Input: Raw CAN data, WindowSize;
Output: Prediction;
. Attacked if Prediction is correct else benign
G = CreateGraph(RawCAN data, W indowSize)
graphListW ithM aximumIndegree = []
. initializing the list of maximum
in-degree from each graph
graphListW ithM aximumOutdegree = [] . initializing the list of maximum
out-degree from each graph
graphListW ithM inimumIndegree = []
. initializing the list of minimum
in-degree from each graph
graphListW ithM inimumOutdegree = [] . initializing the list of minimum
out-degree from each graph
graphListW ithN odesN umber = [] . initializing the list of number of nodes
from each graph
graphListW ithEdgesN umber = [] . initializing the list of number of edges
from each graph
for all gi ∈ G : do
graphListW ithN odesN umber[i] = numberOf N odes(gi )
graphListW ithEdgesN umber[i] = numberOf Edges(gi )
graphListW ithM aximumIndegree[i] = maximumIndegree(gi )
graphListW ithM aximumOutdegree[i] = maximumOutdegree(gi )
graphListW ithM inimumIndegree[i] = minimumIndegree(gi )
graphListW ithM inimumOutdegree[i] = minimumOutdegree(gi )
end for
{P ageRankF eaturesList} = GraphListP ageRank(G) . extract PR-related
feature using Algorithm 1
{data, labels} = processData()
train, test, trainLabels, testLabels = trainT estSplit(data, labels) . splitting
the data and labels for training and testing
model = gaussianN b(train, trainLabels)
. training data
predictions = model.predict(test)
. making the predictions
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Table 1: The proposed methodology uses graphs’ vertices, edges, degrees, and PageRankrelated features for classification.
Features

Names

Number of nodes in a graph

Nodes or Vertex

Number of edges in a graph

Edges

Maximum number of in-degree in a graph

Maximum Indegree

Maximum number of out-degree in a graph

Maximum Outdegree

Minimum number of in-degree in a graph

Minimum Indegree

Minimum number of out-degree in a graph

Minimum Outdegree

Median of PageRanks among nodes in a graph

Median PageRank

Maximum of PageRanks among nodes in a graph Maximum PageRank
Minimum of PageRanks among nodes in a graph

Minimum PageRank

between Line 21 and Line 22, we split the data and labels into training and
test sets and fit the data into a GNB model. We perform attack prediction
in Line 23.
4. Experiments
For verifying the proposed methodology, we used real CAN data and
performed analysis on an Intel Xeon(R) Silver 3.2GHz 20-core processor with
48GB RAM by using our proposed methods in Python language. In our
research, we used raw CAN attacked and attack free data [1]. We refer to
this data set as rawCAN. The attacked data includes DoS, fuzzy, spoofing,
and replay attacks. Besides, we consider the mixed attacks that have all four
kinds of attacks. From the raw CAN bus data, we build ∼ 18.5K, ∼ 37K,
∼ 38K, ∼ 42K, and ∼ 19K, and ∼ 80K attack free, DoS, fuzzy, spoofing,
replay, and mixed attacked graphs.
To apply the proposed GGNB-based anomaly detection algorithm, we used
standard graph features listed in Table 1. Besides, we identify PR-related
features to help detect anomalies. It primarily helps removing the noninformative features from the model [33]. We computed feature importance
for DoS, fuzzy, spoofing, replay, and mixed attacked data, as shown in Figure 4.
We compute the mean differences of the sample features after quantile
transformation, which shows that distinctions are balanced around zero, as
shown in Figure 5(a). However, the variance differences of the feature samples
are entirely on the positive side. So, Figure 5(b) depicts that the positive
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Figure 4: The Maximum Indegree, Maximum Outdegree, and Maximum PageRank have
the highest feature importance for DoS, spoofing, and mixed attacks, respectively and
nodes and edges have the highest feature importance for fuzzy and replay attacks.

likelihood distributions are more concentrated around their means than the
negative ones. These indicate the discriminating power of the model. We can
classify data if the mean difference is far away from the distributions’ centers,
or the variance difference is greater than the distributions’ spread.
After quantile transformation, we identified two features, Maximum Indegree and Maximum Outdegree, which distinguish the two classes very well. To
detect positive or negative class, we observed a closeness between the transformed values of these two features for any graph. Hence, a two-dimensional
plot using the mixed attacked data provides a straight line through the origin,
as shown in Figure 6. The transformed features will maintain a range of values
for most of the graphs of each class. So, after plotting altered Maximum
Indegree and Maximum Outdegree features, we observe a good separation
between negative and positive class, as shown in Figure 6(a). Even without
quantile transformation, the original features’ values can separate the classes
efficiently, as demonstrated in Figure 6(b). Hence, using these features, the
proposed methodology works well for detecting attacked and attack free
graphs.
The quantile transformation of the features helped us identify the classes.
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Figure 5: (a) The mean differences between the two classes have symmetric spread in both
positive and negative direction, and (b) the variance differences of the feature samples are
entirely on the positive side.

(a)

(b)

Figure 6: Separation of classes using Maximum Indegree and Maximum Outdegree features
considering (a) quantile transformed feature, and (b) original features values of mixed
attacks.
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Figure 7: The quantile transformed features values in the range from µ-to-±3σ can clearly
separate attack and attack-free data.

Then, we compute the transformed features’ mean and standard deviations
for both positive and negative categories. For the transformed Maximum
Indegree and Maximum Outdegree, we select random values in the range
from µ-to-±3σ. When we draw the resulting values, it can clearly distinguish
two classes, as shown in Figure 7.
4.1. Comparison of Prediction Accuracy
The proposed algorithm uses 67% and 33% data for training and testing,
respectively. The proposed algorithm efficiently detected DoS, fuzzy, spoof,
and replay attacked graphs and detect any mixed attacks. The proposed
methodology has 99.61%, 99.83%, 96.79%, and 93.35% detection accuracy
considering DoS, fuzzy, spoofing, and replay attacks, respectively. Figure 8(a),
Figure 8(b), Figure 8(c), Figure 8(d) show the confusion matrix of DoS, fuzzy,
spoofing, and replay attacks. One of the major advantages of using proposed
techniques is it can detect mixed attacks. According to our analysis, the
proposed methodology has 96.20% detection accuracy for the mixed attacks,
as shown in Figure 8(e).
Precision indicates the proportion of correctly predicted positive cases,
and a high precision indicates the low false-positive rate of an algorithm [34].
Recall tries to identify all actual positive cases, which is the ratio of correctly
predicted positive observations to all the actual class observations. The F1
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Figure 8: The proposed methodology has a prediction accuracy of (a) 99.61% considering
DoS, (b) 99.83% considering fuzzy, (c) 96.79% considering spoofing, (d) 93.35% considering
replay, and (e) 96.20% for the mixed attacks.
Table 2: When considering DoS attacks, the proposed methodology has 53.79%, 10.75%,
and 38.77% better precision, recall, and F1 scores, respectively, than the state-of-the-art
SVM classifier, using rawCAN data set [1].
SVM [5]

Types of attacks

DCNN [6]

CNB

MNB

GGNB

Pr

Re

F1

Pr

Re

F1

Pr

Re

F1

Pr

Re

F1

Pr

Re

F1

Dos

0.46

0.89

0.61

1.0

0.9989

0.9995

0.9969

1.0

0.9985

0.9966

1.0

0.9983

0.9979

0.9975

0.9977

Fuzzy

-

-

-

0.9995

0.9965

0.9980

0.9945

1.0

0.9972

0.9899

1.0

0.9949

0.9989

0.9989

0.9989

Spoofing

-

-

-

0.9999

0.9992

0.9995

0.9599

0.9997

0.9794

0.9596

1.0

0.9794

0.9605

0.99634

0.9781

Replay

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.9960

0.8561

0.9208

0.9960

0.8576

0.9216

0.9974

0.8714

0.9301

Mixed

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.8889

0.9956

0.9392

0.8889

0.9992

0.9408

0.9978

0.9491

0.9728

Overall

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.9498

0.9807

0.9650

0.9488

0.9822

0.9652

0.9911

0.9655

0.9781

score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. We analyze all three
metrics for the DoS, fuzzy, spoofing, replay, and mixed attacks. We compare
our method with a generic complement naive Bayes (CNB), multinomial naive
Bayes (MNB), and the existing SVM-based [5] and DCNN-bassed [6] IDSs.
The proposed GNB-based methodology has excellent 99.79% precision, which
is better than all the competing methods. Using DoS attacks, the proposed
method has 10.75% and 38.77% better recall and F1 scores, respectively, than
the state-of-the-art SVM classifier. Overall, the proposed methodology has
99.11%, 96.55%, and 97.71% of precisions, recall, and F1 scores, respectively.
In order to verify the efficiency of the proposed methodology, we used
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Figure 9: The proposed methodology has excellent 100%, 99.85%, 99.92%, 100%, and
99.92% detection accuracy considering DoS, diagnostic, fuzzing CAN ID, fuzzing payload,
and replay, respectively.

raw CAN attacked and attack free OpelAstra data set [2]. The attacked
data includes DoS, diagnostic, fuzzing CAN ID, fuzzing payload, replay, and
suspension attacks. Besides, we consider the mixed attacks that have all six
kinds of attacks. From the raw CAN bus data, we build ∼ 13.5K, ∼ 17.6K,
∼ 17.5K, ∼ 17.5K, ∼ 17.5K, ∼ 17.5K, and ∼ 17.5K, and ∼ 37.7K attack
free, DoS, diagnostic, fuzzing CAN ID, fuzzing payload, replay, suspension,
and mixed attacked graphs. The proposed algorithm efficiently detected DoS,
diagnostic, fuzzing CAN ID, fuzzing payload, replay, suspension, and detect
any mixed attacks. The proposed methodology has 100%, 99.85%, 99.92%,
100%, and 99.92% detection accuracy considering DoS, diagnostic, fuzzing
CAN ID, fuzzing payload, and replay, respectively. Figure 9(a), Figure 9(b),
Figure 9(c), Figure 9(d), and Figure 9(e) show the confusion matrix of DoS,
diagnostic, fuzzing CAN ID, fuzzing payload, replay attacks. In addition, the
proposed methodology has 97.75% and 99.57% detection accuracy for the
suspension and mixed attacks, as shown in Figure 10(a) and Figure 10(b),
resspectively.
Similar to the other data set [1], we analyze precision, recall, and F1 scores
for the DoS, diagnostic, fuzzing CAN ID, fuzzing payload, replay, suspension,
and mixed attacks. Table 3 shows the results of this analysis. The proposed
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Figure 10: (a) The proposed methodology has 97.75% detection accuracy considering
suspension attacks, and (b) 99.57% detection accuracy considering mixed attacks, which
includes all six types of CAN attacks.
Table 3: When considering DoS attacks, the proposed methodology applying on the
OpelAstra data set [2] has 54%, 11%, and 39% better precision, recall, and F1 scores,
respectively, than the state-of-the-art SVM classifier.
SVM [5]

Types of attacks

DCN [6]

CNB

MNB

GGNB

Pr

Re

F1

Pr

Re

F1

Pr

Re

F1

Pr

Re

F1

Pr

Re

F1

DoS

0.46

0.89

0.61

1.0

0.9989

0.9995

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

Diagnostic

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.9932

0.9985

0.9959

1.0

0.9977

0.9989

0.9992

0.9992

0.9992

Fuzzing canid

-

-

-

-

-

-

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.9992

0.9996

Fuzzing payload

-

-

-

-

-

-

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

Replay

-

-

-

-

-

-

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.9977

0.9989

0.9992

1.0

0.9996

Suspension

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.9960

0.9992

0.9976

1.0

0.9620

0.9806

0.9763

1.0

0.9880

Mixed

-

-

-

-

-

-

1.0

0.9972

0.9986

1.0

0.9940

0.9970

1.0

0.9957

0.9979

Overall

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.9993

0.9982

0.9987

1.0

0.9936

0.9968

0.9984

0.9973

0.9978

GNB-based methodology has excellent 100% precision, which is better than or
comparable to all the competing methods. Using DoS attacks, the proposed
method has 11% and 39% better recall and F1 scores, respectively, than the
state-of-the-art SVM classifier. Overall, the proposed GGNB methodology has
99.84%, 99.73%, and 99.78% of precision, recall, and F1 scores, respectively.
4.2. Sensitivity Analysis
In order to measure the sensitivity of the proposed methodology for
window size variation, we considered CAN communication window size from
11.5ms to 230ms. A wide range of window variation allows different CAN
communication frequency. According to our analysis, the proposed method’s
accuracy is fairly consistent with the variation of window size, as shown in
Figure 11. The proposed method has a less than 1% accuracy variation in
this extended window size variation considering DoS, spoofing, fuzzy, and
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Figure 11: The prediction accuracy varies by less than 1% for DoS, fuzzy, spoofing, and
replay attacks for 11.5ms to 230ms window size variation, and it exhibits about 2% accuracy
variation for the mixed attacks in the same window variation range using rawCAN [1] data
set.

replay attacks. The proposed method’s accuracy dropped only from 94.42%
to 92.54% for 11.5ms to 230ms window range for mixed attack.
4.3. Comparison of Time and Space Complexity
For the GGNB algorithm, we compute the priors and the likelihood
probabilities for each class in the training phase [35]. We compute the n
records prior in linear time O(n). Considering k features, we calculate k
likelihoods for each class. The likelihood probabilities will be O(nk) for
training two classes. For testing m cases, the proposed GNB algorithm time
complexity is O(mk). For training, the space complexity only considers the
likelihoods for two classes of GNB, resulting in O(k). We computed the
likelihoods during the training phase, so the training phase only requires a
loop up, resulting in testing space complexity of O(m).
Generally, for a dataset with n records and k features, the worst-case
training time is O(kn3 ). For ds support vectors, the test time is in the order
of O(kds ). For training, the space complexity only needs to store ds resulting
in O(ds ). As expected, the proposed GGNB-based methodology has about
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239× and 135× lower training and test time, respectively, compared to the
existing SVM-based anomaly detection system.
4.4. Features Reduction
4.4.1. Correlation Matrix
To correlate the features with the label of the data, we used correlation
matrix [36]. The correlation coefficient can be expressed as
r = qP

i=1 (xi

Pn

n
i=1 (xi

− x̄)(yi − ȳ)

− x̄)2

qP

n
i=1 (yi

− ȳ)2

(8)

where r value in the range of -1 to +1. If two components x and y of the
data are perfectly correlated, then r = +1 or -1, and r = 0 if they are
uncorrelated. The positive value of r indicates the proportional correlation
of the components. On the other hand, the negative value of r indicates the
inverse proportional correlation of the components.
Feature reduction is the process of reducing the number of features in
computation without losing important information and prediction accuracy
[37]. To reduce number of feature variables, we used correlation matrix
for our proposed features, as shown in Figure 12. Maximum Indegree and
Maximum Outdegree are highly correlated with our desired output label (i.e.,
Attacked). Using only these two features the proposed algorithm exhibits
97.25 % accuracy, using mixed attack data. When we incorporate two more
features Median PageRank and Maximum PageRank for detecting attacked
label, we achieved up to 98.06 % accuracy.
4.4.2. Feature Reduction Impact on Performance
Feature reduction leads to the use of fewer resources to complete computations due to the decrease in the number of variables [38]. Expectedly,
feature reduction has a tremendous impact on the proposed methodology’s
performance, as shown in the Table 4. All the results are normalized with
the GGNB algorithm with all nine features. For both the full set of features
and the reduced number of features, the GGNB methodology has the lowest
training time than other naive Bayes algorithms. On the other hand, CNB
has the most down testing time than the other naive Bayes algorithms. With
reduced features, the proposed GGNB algorithm has 18% and 21% lower
training time using rawCAN [1] and OpelAstra [2] data sets, respectively.
The GGNB has 37.5% lower testing time using only four features on both
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Figure 12: The Maximum Indegree and Maximum Outdegree have the highest correlation
with our desired output label or attack detection.
Table 4: With the reduced number of features, the proposed GGNB algorithm has 18%
and 21% lower training time using rawCAN [1] and OpelAstra [2] data sets, respectively.
Data set type

CNB

# of features

MNB

GGNB

Training time

Test time

Accuracy

Training time

Test time

Accuracy

Training time

Test time

Accuracy

rawCAN [1]

9

1.1727

0.6337

0.9075

1.1338

0.6849

0.9098

1.00

1.00

0.9620

s

4

1.0555

0.5012

0.9647

1.0494

0.5733

. 0.7174

0.8196

0.6474

0.9618

OpelAstra [2]

9

0.9024

0.5417

0.9080

0.8780

0.5417

0.9090

1.00

1.00

0.9090

4

0.8415

0.4167

0.9090

0.8171

0.4583

. 0.9090

0.7927

0.6250

0.9087

the data sets with only a minor 0.03% maximum accuracy penalty, as shown
in Table 4.
4.4.3. FPGA Implementation Results
We have implemented the proposed naive Bayes-based algorithms in a
Xilinx Zybo Z7 board as shown in Figure 13. Among different naive Bayesbased algorithms, CNB requires lower computation resources than the other
two methodologies for attack prediction. For example, the proposed CNB
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requires 5.3×, 4.7×, 6.4×, and 6.5× fewer slices, LUTs, flip-flops, and DSP
cores, respectively, than the GGNB method. Moreover, the proposed GGNB
requires 5.7×, 5.9×, 5.1×, and 3.6× fewer slices, LUTs, flip-flops, and DSP
units, respectively, compared to a conventional NN architecture with 4-hidden
layers where each layer contains 500 neurons [13].
5. Conclusion
We have presented the first-ever GGNB algorithm by using common graph
properties and PR-related features. When we apply the proposed algorithm
on real rawCAN data set [1], the GGNB method has 99.61%, 99.83%, 96.79%,
and 93.35% detection accuracy considering DoS, fuzzy, spoofing, and replay
attacks, respectively. Moreover, this is the first-ever method with 96.20%
detection accuracy for mixed attacks.
Using OpelAsta data set [2], the proposed methodology has 100%, 99.85%,
99.92%, 100%, 99.92%, 97.75% and 99.57% detection accuracy considering
DoS, diagnostic, fuzzing CAN ID, fuzzing payload, replay, suspension, and

Zybo Z7 used
for proposed IDS

Figure 13: The proposed GGNB requires 5.7×, 5.9×, 5.1×, and 3.6× fewer slices, LUTs,
flip-flops, and DSP units, respectively, than conventional NN architecture.
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mixed attacks, respectively.
Better yet, the proposed GGNB-based methodology has about 239× and
135× lower training and test time, respectively, compared to the existing
SVM classifiers. Furthermore, the proposed correlation matrix-based feature
reduction method reduces training time by 18% and 21% using rawCAN [1]
and OpelAstra [2] data sets, respectively. Using a reduced number of features,
the proposed method shows 37.5% lower testing time on both the data sets
with only a minor 0.03% maximum accuracy penalty.
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